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Dear Rector,  
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
PROLOGUE: LAW , POWER AND MORALITY: WHO WINS? 
Should Thucydides be read in the light of the Sophists or is he better understood as a 
predecessor of Aristotle? Although his account of the Peloponnesian War was written almost 
two and a half millennia ago, the question still bothers the minds of students of International 
Relations. The usual interpretation of this Greek author as founder of the Realist School 
bases itself particularly on the Melian Dialogue.1 Crucial in that exchange of views between 
the militarily strong Athenians and the weak inhabitants of the island of Melos is a still often 
quoted admonition by the former to the latter:  
 
‘not to imagine that you will influence us by saying  … that you have never done us any harm …since you 
know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice 
depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do 
and the weak accept what they have to accept (“δυνατα δε οι προυχοντες πρασσουσι και οι ασϑενεις 
ξυγχωρουσιν”)’.2  
 
The Melians, however, do not accept, trusting in the justice of their cause and hoping for the 
help of the Gods and the Spartans. Subsequently, the whole story ends with the conquest of 
Melos by the Athenians, the killing of all male inhabitants of military age and the selling of 
all women and children into slavery. Justice, the message seems to be, is not for international 
politics. What counts is ‘the law of the stronger’. 
 
In a recent article Nancy Kokaz argues that Thucydides does criticize Sophistic dichotomies 
of power and justice, human nature and convention, domestic and international politics.3 Her 
point is that throughout the Melian dialogue ‘there is never a doubt that the Athenian action 
violates rules of “fair play and just dealing”.’4 The Melians use the wrong arguments, 
referring as they do to their own self constraint in regard to the Athenians and to Athenian 
self-interest – if you conquer and destroy us, the Spartans will come and do the same unto 
you – while hoping for outside help. They do not, however, appeal to justice. In fact, the 
Athenians do have a normative view on power: ‘to stand up to one’s equals, to behave with 
deference towards one’s superiors, and to treat one’s inferiors with moderation’. This maxim 
is called ‘safe rule’ rather than ‘just rule’, probably, Kokaz feels, because in the Athenian 
mind there could be no conflict between genuine considerations of safety and justice. The 
condition of humanity5 is not that power automatically amounts to domination: it ‘offers both 
constructive and destructive possibilities depending on its use’.6 The Athenians only maintain 
that the standard of justice varies with the power of those concerned. What Thucydides hates, 
like Aristotle after him, is mere ‘cleverness’ as expressed in the Melian arguments. Practical 
wisdom goes deeper; it requires moderation and justice. Thucydides, Kokaz argues, ‘offers us 
an invitation to move beyond the Sophists and rediscover our human potential for political 
excellence.’ 7 
 
Here we are, at the beginning of the third millennium, and still discussing Thucydidean 
perspectives on moderating power. But should that surprise us? Has humankind in the ages 
since Thudydides found conclusive answers in the triangle of law, power and morality? 
Should human rights perhaps be seen as a way out of these dialectics, some sort of synthesis 
in the form of a decisive instrument to moderate power by binding its use to internationally 
accepted legal standards? Is this humankind’s definitive response to the moral history of 
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inhumanity as exemplified by the killing of the Melian men and all those terrible violations 
of human dignity through the ages?8 No – I wish to argue today – it is a beginning, marked 
by strong ideals and convictions but also by constraints and setbacks. To try and protect 
human dignity by law implies toil and trouble: laborious law, in other words. 
 
Human rights and the dialectics of law and power  
The tendency to abuse power is as old as human history. Therefore the use of power should 
always be tied to certain norms. Where such norms express legal protection of the fundamental 
freedoms and basic entitlements of each and every human being, we speak of ‘human rights’. 
Since here human dignity itself is at stake, claims based on these rights should normally trump 
other types of claims, both private and public.  
 
Notably, however, the global endeavour for the realization of human rights suffers from a huge 
deficit that is all too often submerged in the general euphoria of human rights declarations, 
conferences, committee meetings and workshops. Watch, for example, the still so difficult 
struggle against impunity of state-related perpetrators of violations of civil and political 
rights; look at the apparent lack of protection offered to minorities; consider the continued 
barrier of the public-private divide and its paralysing effects on the struggle against domestic 
violence; note the non-fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) in a world in 
which so many people’s basic needs remain denied. That fundamental weakness in human 
rights concerns their relation to social reality: declared rights, all too often, at the beginning 
of what are bound to be long and enduring struggles for implementation rather than acquired 
rights in the sense of formal legal protection of freedoms and titles that had already acquired 
societal recognition as sources of entitlements.  
 
The purpose of rights, as interests protected by law (Von Jhering), is to put conflicts of 
interests in a normative setting and thus to prevent their manifestation as pure power 
struggles. But although rights are abstract acknowledgements of claims in the sense of a 
general commitment to offer legal protection for their realization, the world is full of denials 
of claims founded upon people’s fundamental freedoms and basic entitlements. Actually, 
while the whole idea of rights is based upon the expectation that evident violations would 
lead to contentious action resulting in redress, human rights often remain without effective 
remedies. This is due to two crucial deficiencies: firstly, the often prevailing inadequacy of 
law as a check on power, and secondly, the lack of reception of these rights in many cultural 
and politico-economic contexts.  
 
In terms of the role and rule of law, society is expected to function in such a way that rights 
are respected, and claims based on entitlements connected to those rights get honoured. 
Dispute settlement is confined to cases in which there are conflicting claims protected by 
different rights (between landlord and tenant, for example). In the case of human rights, 
however, adequate embodiment in positive law is all too often lacking, while they get 
violated in and from centres of power, too. There are notable differences in context here. 
While in the Netherlands, for example, freedom of speech is protected by a historically 
acquired right, in China it is based on an internationally declared right that is structurally 
violated from the national political centre. In the case of economic, social and cultural rights 
general recognition at the centres of power in the global economy is even lacking.   
 
The character of human rights as ‘declaratory’ rather than ‘conclusive’ concerns economic, 
social and cultural rights in particular and manifests itself especially in countries in the South. 
4
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This is not just a matter of socioeconomic  context: no jobs, no access to land and hence 
extreme pressure on scarce productive resources that breeds frustration and aggression rather 
than recognition of other people’s freedoms and needs. There is also a political setting that 
finds its background in the history of colonialism and its effects on the distribution and 
control of power, both internationally and in local contexts. As a result the fight for social 
justice in a modern economy and polity has a long way to go. Internationally that struggle has 
not yielded impressive fruits up till now. Over the past two centuries the gaps between the 
richest and the poorest countries have widened while in absolute terms in the poorest region, 
sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people living on less than one US dollar a day increased 
considerably during the nineteen nineties.9 As a result of decisions taken in the name of 
economic progress, the world’s poor often face increasing hardships from day to day.10 In 
that dim light the toughness of the struggle for social justice within so many developing 
countries could hardly be seen as surprising.  
 
Obviously, the human rights venture as envisaged requires laborious law based on 
functioning legal systems, internationally as well as in domestic settings. To see what that 
means let us now first go a little deeper into the meaning of law.  
 
BETWEEN SYSTEM AND LIFEWORLD: THE ROLE OF THE REGULAE IURIS 
The essence of law, as we have seen, is that it binds power to certain norms, implying at the 
least normative processes of settling disputes. This is a mission of a highly noble character as 
exemplified in the inscription shown in the reading room of the Harvard Law School’s 
library: OF LAW NO LESSE CAN BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAN THAT HER SEAT IS THE BOSOM OF 
GOD.11 The reference to the Upright One implies an allegiance to justice. Legal norms then 
are meant not only to regulate in the sense of securing order but also to reflect what is 
generally seen as right and hence ought to be enforced. Law, in other words, binds power to a 
morality that is seen as essential to the integrity of the community as such.12  
 
This rather idealistic view depicts law as it is meant to be: justice incognito. At the other 
extreme we find anti-law: the use of legal instruments to institutionalize injustice.13 Karl 
Marx saw law as rooted in class relations: ‘right can never be higher than the economic 
structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby’. Socioeconomic power, 
in that view, completely dominates law. Or, in the words of a 16th century English song: 
‘Law grinds the poor and rich men make the law’.14  
 
Reality tends to lie somewhere between, on the one hand, the binding of power to norms 
rooted in morality and, on the other hand, the reflection of existing power relations in the 
setting and execution of such standards. These dialectics of law and power are appealingly 
echoed in the way in which the notorious villain Bul Super – a comic figure in Marten 
Toonder’s Adventures of Tom Poes – expresses his view on law: ‘right is something crooked 
that has been twisted’.  
 
The issue then, is law’s moral foundations and connections. Obviously, human rights are 
rooted in justice, first and foremost. Yet, the global venture for the protection of human 
dignity is shaped in modern universalistic law, with bureaucratic mechanisms of standard-
setting, monitoring and procedures to enforce compliance. Consequently, the whole project 
has certain traits of a functional system, and it is precisely in its fundamental link to morality 
that the human rights system needs constant renurturing from a lifeworld perspective. 
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I am expressing myself now in terms of Jürgen Habermas’ distinction between ‘system’ 
and ‘lifeworld’.15 For Habermas, the impersonal relationships that typify an exchange 
economy as well as a modern polity, imply that both tend to function as systems, 
separated from the lifeworld of culture, social interaction and personality. A topical 
illustration of what this refers to is the organization of agriculture in the European Union 
and its alienation from the lifeworld of animals and people. Law, then, secures the 
independence of economy and state from lifeworld structures. It regulates exchange 
relations through property and contract and institutionalizes the political system by 
defining bureaucratic positions based on administrative law. Modern law is not grounded 
in normative rightness but is: positive in the sense of the outcome of established 
processes of law-making; legalistic, implying an orientation towards rules; and formal, 
meaning that cases are judged under what has been regulated with a view to ‘equal’ 
treatment of ‘equal’ cases.  
 
Yet, it is precisely in the lifeworld that morality (and immorality for that matter) finds its 
roots.16 Modern law then is functional coercion and as such in need of normative 
justification. This confronts us with the crucial notion of legitimacy. While Weber saw law’s 
claim to legitimacy as based purely on political domination, for Habermas enacted law 
cannot secure the basis of its legitimacy simply through legality.17 Indeed, with its many 
manifestations of illegitimate rule the twentieth century has generally confronted humankind 
with the complexity of legitimacy as a concept transcending formal-procedural legality. 
Grounded in people’s convic tion that the way power is exercised over them and the way in 
which they are being ruled are right, legitimacy transforms power into authority. In this light 
legitimacy becomes not so much a fact but a process. The right procedures (due process) are 
only one aspect of this; other elements concern the right principles and institutions and an 
outcome acceptable to those affected by the exercise of power.18 In terms of legitimacy the 
continuous challenge is, in other words, to find law in its ‘lifeworld’ connection to justice.19 
 
Notably, that need to transcend purely formal legality is nothing new. Through the ages 
substantial legitimization has been enhanced by applying the old principles of law-finding: 
the regulae iuris. They throw light upon concrete cases in which legal rules first have to be 
determined as applicable and then applied in line with a correct interpretation. As maxims 
(maximae propositiones) the rules of law rest on everyday common sense; as concise 
declarations of the demands of justice (generalia iuris principia) they are rooted in morality. 
An example of legal common sense is the rule that everything that has come into being 
through certain causes, can be dissolved by the same causes.20 General principles of justice 
may be illustrated by the rule that without guilt there can be no punishment.21 Often the 
regulae combine elements of both logic and fairness, exemplified, for example by the rule 
that whosoever carries the burden should also be entitled to the benefits.22 Usually their form 
is short and succinct while their authority rests on past experience in law-finding. In the 
difficult task of weighing the different interests involved, the regulae assist those charged 
with law-making as well as those responsible for law-finding in concrete cases. 
 
These rules of law then, exert an immediate appeal to both heart and mind. Thus, Baldus 
stated that a party in a court case that can invoke a regula iuris might be considered as being 
prima facie in its right.23 While apparently that could be said in the fourteenth century, the 
regulae have maintained their validity through the ages. For example, the stipulation that no 
one can change his policy to another person’s unfair detriment24, acquired a modern 
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translation in the principle of good government which demands that justified expectations as 
have been raised, cannot be neglected. Paul Scholten has typified such general principles of 
law as the desk light that may shine so clearly upon a case that what the ceiling light of the 
statute books could not reveal, suddenly becomes clearly visible.25 
 
Some regulae are quite precise, particularly those that pertain to due process. As examples 
may serve the well-known rule that not just one party but both parties should be heard (audi 
et alteram partem), and the rule that no one can be a judge in his own case (nemo iudex in 
sua propria causa). Other regulae are of a highly general character, e.g. the exclamation that 
freedom is of inestimable value (libertas inaestimabilis res est).26 A little more concrete, but 
still common to many topics is the requirement of good faith (bona fides). Beside such rules 
there are also those which are particular to one topic, e.g. sale can break no rent.  
 
As ‘the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ the regulae iuris have been 
acknowledged as a source of law-finding for the International Court of Justice (art. 38(1)(c) 
of the ICJ Statute). But apart from their role as guidelines in adjudication they also play their 
part in law-making and administration. While most rules originate in Roman law, many have 
been incorporated in the Corpus Iuris Canonicis and in subsequent law books as well. Yet, 
legal incorporation in recognized texts such as Dinus’ treatise on the Rules of the Sext is not 
the essence. Important is not the formal source of a rule of law but its immediate appeal to 
the legal mind and the moral heart. Principally their role lies in the need for legitimacy rather 
than pure legality. It is that evident connection to formal and substantial justice through 
which they may play such a significant part in political, administrative and judicial decision-
making. 
 
In a Habermasean framework the regulae may be seen as a first mode of resistance by the 
lifeworld to a rules-driven jurisprudence. In regard to the various waves of juridification in 
modern history Habermas himself mentions three distinct ways in which the lifeworld has 
resisted a strict separation of law from morality (as argued by Weber27). A first response to 
law as pure formality is embodied in the modern notion of the human being as an individual 
with rights. This implies legal protection of individual interests against detrimental use of 
power by others, including the sovereign (the state). Different subjective rights may well 
clash, necessitating in concrete cases a weighing of the various interests involved in the light 
of the normativity embodied in legal rules. Secondly, democratization of the political order 
tends to confront persons holding office with reactions by those in whose private and public 
interests power is supposed to be executed. Finally, in modern industrialized countries the 
social welfare state  guarantees freedoms and rights against the economic system. 
 
These three modes of resistance to law as pure domination may well be conceived as bridges 
between systems of functional formality and the lifeworld of (inter)personal normativity. In 
this address the emphasis is particularly on the first bridge, taken in its normative setting of 
human rights. 
 
Human rights as laborious element in legal systems  
From a legal-philosophical perspective human rights may be seen as connecting general 
principles of justice with the conception of human beings as individuals with subjective 
rights. Each distinct human right has a core that relates to human dignity. Behind that core is 
a general principle connected with public justice in the sense of a communal conviction of 
what is right and so crucial for the integrity of the public -political community that it ought to 
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be enforced. Examples of such principles of justice as reflected in the International Bill of 
Rights are liberty, equality, due process (with sub-principles such as habeas corpus and 
objectivity and impartiality in judicial decision-making), humanity (respect for human life), 
the integrity of the body, privacy, stability of possessions28, participation29, etc. The next step in 
terms of standard-setting is to elaborate these principles in legal texts aimed at incorporation in 
different types of domestic law. The relative success of such attempts to further positivize 
human rights depends firstly on the question whether in the country in question legal systems do 
function, secondly on their judicial and political openness to the crucial issue of legitimacy as a 
notion transcending pure formal legality, and thirdly on cultural factors. Indeed, spiritual roots of 
a culture of human rights have to be found in different social and cultural contexts.30 Hence, in 
accepting their responsibility for the implementation of human rights states are well advised to 
look for religious and other types of moral support for efforts made within the environment of 
their specific jurisdiction as well as in an international setting. This applies to the North as well 
as the South. Particularly problematic in the American setting, for example, is the principle of 
recognition of need – social justice – that lies behind articles 22 to 25 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. The struggle for social justice appeals to people’s sense of solidarity and collective 
responsibility. But in the context of a settlers’ society like the USA – a country that has such 
a dominant influence on global culture – it is individual autonomy rather than social justice 
that dominates legal and political thinking. (‘Your well-being is not my concern. I made it, 
now you have to make it!’). As we all know, this type of politico-legal thinking is not 
confined to just the USA. Notably, the culture underlying economic globalization is generally 
based on possessive individualism rather than social justice.  
 
While the international community still lacks the means to enforce the fundamental freedoms 
that have been declared as universal rights, basic entitlements for each and every human 
being apparently cannot acquire a human rights profile  by simple declaration. Yet, the 
formulation of basic entitlements to education, health care, food, clothing, housing and 
employment as rights has raised expectations and ‘rights-based approaches’ further increase 
these. Thus, the world of human rights is a world of unfulfilled expectations. While, 
inevitably, human rights have to be incorporated in the systems of our time, a serious concern 
today is that they have become a typical system of their own: intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental centres, compliance and complaints procedures with commissions, 
committees and courts of law, training programmes and academic teaching courses, often quite 
far removed from lifeworld perspectives. The term ‘secular religion’ is used in this connection, 
and that is meant particularly in an institutional sense. 
 
Is it advisable, then, to capitulate and abandon that whole venture for the protection of human 
dignity through rights? My answer is no, because in the global struggle to bind all use of 
power to essential standards we have nothing that could better suit the requirements of 
protecting people’s human dignity in a modern setting. Rhetoric, true, but a strong and 
morally compelling rhetoric. Rights do, indeed, fulfil the important function of providing 
legal protection to subjective claims based on recognized interests, and hence incorporation 
of human rights in functioning legal systems must be seen as essential, but even where this is 
not yet the case they can still be seen as statements of what is right, an objective moral code, 
in other words. 
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At this point an aside is in place: the word ‘moral’ here concerns the grounding of these 
rights in morality and does not imply that human rights should be considered as ‘moral 
rights’ as opposed to ‘legal rights’. It is particularly in political science circles in North 
America that we find that juxtaposition. The term ‘moral rights’ stands for rights that cannot 
be enforced or, in other words, rights without remedies.31 But, one might ask, isn’t that the 
essence of the human rights deficit: rights without remedies? Well, my answer to that would 
be that remedies are never automatic; for one thing rights-holders always have to claim what 
they are due. So the term ‘acquired rights’ should not be misinterpreted to mean rights with 
automatic remedies. Rights are ‘performative’ (Austin) and one of the things that make 
human rights distinct is that, perhaps more than other rights they are particularly 
performative. The point made earlier is that in many respects the struggle for their 
implementation is still in its early stages, and hence these rights often cannot offer 
immediately effective remedies.  
 
The word ‘right’, then, holds a legal significance, signifying that what is confirmed in such 
terminology is right and ought to be protected by law so as to guarantee enforcement. Like 
law itself, rights find their meaning in order and justice. As human rights are rooted in 
justice, their realization is not just a matter of enforcing positive law but a moral issue.  
 
Political economy of human rights 
Let us now return to the strategic model on which the global human rights venture is based: 
international standard-setting and monitoring coupled, principally, with local struggles for 
enforcement and implementation. In this endeavour international agencies for development 
cooperation such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have chosen to 
concentrate their efforts on ‘enabling environments’ in the sense of enhancing the right type 
of conditions under which people can exercise their human rights. It is abundantly clear, 
however, that many people live in environments which, far from being conducive to local 
implementation, must be regarded as hostile to any efforts for the protection of basic human 
dignity. In such disabling conditions human rights tend to function not so much as legal 
resources but as political instruments to mobilize dissent, protest, opposition and collective 
action aimed at social and economic reform.  
 
It is particularly in adverse conditions as those pertaining in situations of extreme pressure on 
scarce resources that a political economy analysis may be enlightening.32 It implies a meta-
juridical approach that looks beyond disciplinary boundaries. Empirically, the triangle economy-
polity-law is of central importance. Crucial is the analysis of economic, political and legal 
aspects of problems and policies at their interface and in their interaction. 
 
Political economy of human rights, then, is a way of looking behind systemic violations and 
structural non-implementation. Remarkably, its contribution is not restricted to economic, 
social and cultural rights. Lack of implementation of civil, political and cultural rights, too, 
has to be assessed in a politico-economic context. Lederach has pointed, for example, to the 
‘justice gap’ in efforts directed at peace-making.33 Behind collective violence there often lies 
a ‘root conflict’ (Galtung) related to economic aspects of public justice. Apparently, when the 
violence ends, people expect not only pacification but also serious efforts towards economic 
justice.34 
 
Yet, the primary contribution of political economy of human rights lies in the field of 
socioeconomic rights. The core focus is acquirement: why and how people succeed in 
9
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acquiring what they need for sustainable livelihoods. The methodology I have proposed here 
starts with Amartya Sen’s notion of entitlement failure, as advanced in his ‘Poverty and 
Famines’.35 Indeed, behind failing claims to essential goods and services are deficient 
entitlement positions, and behind entitlement failure are malfunctioning entitlement systems. 
 
Of course, this address is not the right occasion to present a full introduction to entitlement 
(sub)systems analysis. The Chair in Political Economy of Human Rights, as established in 
the Law Faculty of this University, relates to both the Netherlands Research School on 
Human Rights and the CERES Research School for Development Studies. In that 
institutional setting I intend to further develop and elaborate this methodology into an 
operational framework for the study of situations of structural non-implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights. I shall now restrict myself to just a brief explanation of 
its essence. First a basic distinction has to be made between rights, entitlements and claims. A 
right implies neither more nor less than an abstract acknowledgement of claims. Entitlement 
is concrete: lawful command over a good or service in a specified use.36 A claim is an actual 
act of acquirement. Let me give you an example: The owner of a house is generally 
presumed free to use it. This includes the presumption of an entitlement to live there. Hence 
he may well claim actual occupancy of those premises. But it is quite possible that another 
person is already entitled to occupy that house, a tenant, for example. If both claim 
occupancy at the same time the judge in question will look behind the conflicting claims and 
weigh the relative strengths of the respective rights as well as the different interests of the 
parties. If in the light of the rules and the facts the case seems to be unclear, general 
principles may well provide the clarity that is needed to find the law in this specific dispute. 
In regard to this type of case, for example, an old regula  says ‘Nemo de domo sua extrahi 
debet’; a modern principle is ‘Sale can break no rent’.  
 
In the same way in which the relation between abstract rights and concrete entitlements is not 
mechanical, neither is there an automatic link between entitlements and honoured claims 
(actual acquirement). Usually, in order to claim what one wants certain activities are required 
within processes of production, distribution and consumption of goods and services: land has 
to be worked, commodities have to be manufactured and sold, services have to be delivered, 
consumer goods have to be bought in shops, a door has to be opened with a key, etc. 
Entitlements provide neither more nor less than access to such processes; actual acquirement 
also requires activities and action. 
 
Now, suppose a person is homeless simply because she lacks any concrete entitlement to 
occupy any premises. What then, in terms of concrete entitlements, is the implication of her 
housing right as defined in article 25 of the UDHR and article 11 of the ICESCR? Well, 
unfortunately, this human right does not generally function as a direct source of concrete 
entitlements. If, however, a homeless individual takes concrete action in order to find a roof 
above her head, that housing right as recognized in international law, may well play its part. 
In the Netherlands this is what actually happened in the nineteen-sixties and seventies when 
squatters began occupying houses that stood empty as the owners used their property for 
speculative purposes only. Another type of consequence that might follow from the general 
housing right is a judicial prohibition to deprive human beings from access to their sole resort 
without offering an alternative. In Indian public interest litigation, for instance, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that homeless beggars cannot be simply removed from pavements of streets 
on which they lay their heads. In short, while generally economic rights have been declared 
as rights without entitlements, entitlements following from the human right in question can 
10
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be asserted through concrete action. Human rights, in other words, are transformational, too: 
they establish a normative framework for processes of social change. 
 
As there can be rights without entitlements, the opposite may equally obtain. Thus, a peasant 
may have lawful access to a plot simply because a relevant authority – e.g. the chief of his 
tribe – granted this for as long as he works that piece of land. Indeed, institutional relations 
may also serve as entitlement (sub)systems. Highly relevant in this connection is the 
relationship between citizens and their state. Generally, state power may serve as a source of 
many concrete entitlements. However, the state may also interfere negatively in people’s 
entitlements, through expropriation for example. Hence, for the purpose of human rights 
implementation government policies and actions have to be closely monitored in their effects 
upon the entitlement positions of those living in daily hardship.  
 
It is the universality of human rights as internationally accepted standards of legitimacy that 
makes it possible to mobilize international support in struggles against their violation, too. 
International pressure, through reporting or other types of procedures by the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur for Housing for example, may well contribute to processes of acquiring 
actual recognition of people’s housing needs. Indeed, it is often (international) 
nongovernmental organizations rather than states that fight side-by-side with those carrying 
out their responsibilities in UN compliance mechanisms. 
 
 
Epilogue: Alternative approaches to law, power and morality 
Notably, the possibility of taking human rights abuse to court tends to be underestimated, 
particularly in regard to economic, social and cultural rights. Although, as has been pointed 
out, a homeless individual cannot usually sue the state for provision of a house, forced 
evictions or cutting off essential services can be contested in courts of law. There is a 
difference, in other words, between a state of non-implementation and a concrete act of 
violation. Now, if human rights were no more than subjective rights albeit of a special type, 
the four major areas of impunity characterizing the human rights deficit mentioned at the 
beginning of this presentation (impunity of state-related violators of basic human dignity, of 
perpetrators of crimes within the four walls of the home, of oppressors of minorities, and of 
those responsible for socioeconomic deprivation) would have a paralysing effect on the 
whole venture. In that case the issue would be confined to justiciability. But the main point I 
am making in this address is that precisely in situations in which the use of legal resources 
becomes problematic, the function of human rights as standards of legitimacy is activated: 
confrontation of abuse of power with norms based on protection of human dignity. 
Government housing policies, to come back to our example, must be based on the right of 
everyone to live in a decent house, and government budgets should reflect the priority given 
to the satisfaction of people’s housing needs.  
 
Human rights, then, must be seen not merely as subjective rights – to be enforced through 
claims based on entitlements derived from them – but also as general principles of justice. In 
the latter meaning they may play their part in adjudication too, not as a direct basis for the 
acceptance of certain claims but to throw light upon a case, in the same way in which the old 
regulae iuris perform that function.37 Let us take, for example, the damages suffered by small 
fishermen when, in the name of development, big trawlers are introduced that go into the 
shallow waters, destroying the breeding grounds for the fish that forms the basis of their 
livelihoods. It is true that in contentious action these people may fail to get recognition of 
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claims based on a subjective ‘right to development’ but in concrete litigation procedures the 
right to development may well be invoked in order to determine responsibility for a tort.38 
 
Thus far, the emphasis has been on law in a modern universalistic sense, i.e. enforcement of 
rules through regularized mechanisms. If, however, the realization of fundamental norms 
binding the use of power were purely dependent on formal legal processes, in many places 
deficits in the enforcement of crucial standards would be much worse. Fortunately, however, 
law can also work through informal mechanisms or, in another terminology, as living law.39  
 
While ‘law’ manifests itself as regulation of power, living law has the nature of ‘anti-power’. 
An illustration may be taken from the social history of slavery in Barbados. Records of slave 
births and sales show that from the end of the eighteenth century onwards infants were no 
longer sold apart from their mothers and the nuclear family became a common phenomenon 
among slaves, implying among other things that husbands and wives were also not sold 
separately.40 Apparently female slaves regarded motherhood as ‘a customary right’; yet there 
was no justiciability whatsoever since slaves were regarded as chattel and certainly not 
recognized as legal subjects. What we come across here is noticeable self-enforcement of 
human rights by informal means.41  
 
Moreover, as has been stated several times already, human rights function not only as legal 
resources but as political instruments: standards of legitimacy, applicable to any use of 
power, whether by the state or by non-state actors. The processes through which this is 
effectuated may have a formal as well as an informal character. Besides living law, in other 
words, we also touch upon living politics as a way of confronting power with human rights 
standards. To illustrate the meaning of living politics it may be helpful to juxtapose two 
distinct situations: a parliament without a free press means dead politics, a free press without 
a parliament would lead to living politics. In the case of the fishermen described above, those 
in power might feel aware of a potential resistance that is still submerged but would be likely 
to get activated when the local population see their fishing grounds destroyed. Such a hidden 
potential, based as it is on strong feelings of justice and injustice, might discourage big 
trawlers from fishing in shallow waters. It is, indeed, in regard to non-state actors, too, that 
living politics is likely to become increasingly relevant.42  
 
Notably, globalization today also affects interpretations of legitimacy. As a consequence, 
principles in regard to the use of power become more and more general in the sense of being 
shared in the whole ius gentium. In regard to human rights this opens the way to more 
inductive approaches. To clarify: a deductive approach derives concrete rights from 
international treaties and other formal sources; an inductive approach starts from what people 
see themselves as the fundamental freedoms and entitlements that everyone should enjoy. 
Such a growing focus on lifeworld contexts also applies to processes of legitimization. Non-
state actors, too, face the consequences of this development.  
 
The point is of course that notwithstanding their formal legal position all institutions today 
exercise their power in a world in which there is growing consensus as to the unacceptability 
of human rights abuse in general and in regard to interpretations of what precisely constitutes 
such abuse in particular. Whereas it is true, for instance, that the churches in the Netherlands 
do not fall within the realm of the General Equal Treatment Act43, they may be expected to 
face increasing pressures from within Dutch society to observe the principle of non-
discrimination. Although general principles pertaining to legal entities stipulated in the Dutch 
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Civil Code are formally not applicable to churches, to mention another example, in practice 
analogous application of principles as bona fides by secular law courts has already been 
accepted by the Supreme Court.44 The same applies to general principles of worker’s 
protection that lie behind labour law, notwithstanding formal exemptions of churches from 
such legislation.45 
 
In short, then, institutional decisions that affect the lives of people are more and more 
confronted with universal standards of legitimacy, including the old regulae iuris and modern 
human rights. While the international venture for the protection of human rights has been set 
up with particular emphasis on the role of the state, today there is a growing attention to 
human rights observance by non-state actors (Drittwirkung). Since historically the 
applicability of rules of justice has never been confined to the state, such a development 
should not surprise us. Moreover, in the major challenge of bridging functional systems and 
lifeworld morality, states and non-state actors need each other.  
 
It is time to conclude. Our concern has been with human rights as a global response to the 
dialectics of power and justice as discussed almost two and a half millennia ago by 
Thucydides. The project of protecting the basic human dignity of each and every human 
being by declaring universal rights did not prove to be simple. Declared rights are rights, and 
a rights-based organization of society demands functioning legal systems. This is already a 
major challenge, as De Soto has shown in the key chapter on ‘The Mystery of Legal Failure’ 
in his recent book The Mystery of Capital.46 Declaring rights further implies that much more 
is necessary than just protecting already acquired bundles of entitlements. Human rights law 
is laborious law. In many a politico-economic context the transformation of these declared 
rights into acquired rights with guaranteed freedoms and entitlements for everyone, requires 
long and enduring struggles. As for civil and political rights it is the political order that has to 
be confronted. In the case of economic, social and cultural rights it is the entitlement 
(sub)systems that lie behind structural non-implementation which would have to be changed 
and that means a confrontation with the economic powers that be.  
 
Actually, the whole human rights venture faces three major threats from within. The first is a 
simplification of human rights, with universality seen as just a matter of international law –
and with that an already settled issue. Although clear in a legal sense, in political and cultural 
terms universality remains a major challenge, requiring continuous mobilization of support 
from every possible quarter in the struggle to protect the dignity of all. Indeed, the global 
human rights venture necessitates so much more than just the involvement of international 
lawyers, however important their role  may be. The second danger also lies in a 
conceptualization of human rights as pure system, far removed from lifeworld realities. I am 
referring here to legal instrumentalism: law as an instrument of social change. In fact the 
assessment ‘rights with remedies’ is as simplistic as ‘rights without remedies’. The real tasks 
we are facing today are no longer primarily in standard-setting but in the tribulations of 
implementation. The third risk is in capitulation: the feeling that human rights law is of such 
a laborious nature that we had better abandon the whole venture. What I have tried to show 
today is, firstly, that laborious law is not impossible law as long as one refrains from 
positivist dogmatism, while being prepared to look creatively for new ways of using human 
rights as legal resources. In this connection I have sketched the role of human rights as not 
just subjective rights in the conventional sense but general principles of justice which may 
play their part in adjudication in a way similar to that of the old regulae iuris. In regard to 
both economic, social and cultural rights and collective rights this opens new venues in 
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litigation. Secondly, and related to that, I have pointed to the role of human rights as general 
standards of legitimacy. As such they may function in alternative approaches to the dialectics 
of power and morality such as living law and also as instruments in the politics of protecting 
human dignity. 
 
Human rights, then, is to be seen as a laborious, but not impossible, venture and from a 
civilizational perspective a crucial challenge in our world today. 
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